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Four Steps to Progress: A Reality Test
for Assembly Bill 900
By MICHAEL MARCUS*
CALIFORNIA'S 2007 ASSEMBLY BILL 900 responds to California's
prison crisis by pledging over seven billion dollars to add 53,000
prison and jail beds, proclaiming attention to treatment and prisoner
reentry, and authorizing some fifty million dollars for treatment and
rehabilitation services. 1 As such, AB 900 exhibits the current state of
criminal justice in our world 2: stubborn persistence in imprisonment
for serious crime and underfunded, largely untested programs for minor crime. The bill responds to swelling prison populations with more
prisons, to program shortages with some program funding and incentives, and to persistent magical thinking with a minor role for science.
The magical thinking is that because we punish in the name of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, we therefore reduce crime
through these mechanisms; that because we send offenders to programs nominally related to their crimes, they benefit from those programs. Because these responses reflect rather than confront the major
flaws in criminal justice, they hold limited promise for success-if
"success" is defined as the efficient allocation of resources measured
* Michael Marcus (J.D. 1969, Boalt Hall) has been an Oregon trial judge since 1990.
He has promoted legislation, judicial conference resolutions, and technology applications
designed to improve sentencing measured by harm reduction. He has published and
presented papers and articles in Oregon as well as nationally and internationally in pursuit
of "smart sentencing." For more information on his work, see http://www.smart
sentencing.com.
1. Press Release, Office of the Governor of the State of Cal., Gov. Schwarzenegger
Signs Historic Bipartisan Agreement, Takes Important Step Toward Solving California's
Prison Overcrowding Crisis (May 3, 2001), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/
press-release/6119/; Public Safety and Offender Rehabilitation Services Act of 2007, Assem. 900, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
2. The analysis holds for at least all western countries. See generally Michael Marcus,
Justitia's Bandage: Blind Sentencing, 1 INr'LJ. PUNISHMENT & SENT'G 1 (2005) [hereinafter
Marcus, Justitia's Bandage].
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by crime reduction. 3 Fortunately, AB 900 does include a glimmer of
hope by assigning at least some role for science, linking reintegration
with public safety, and including strategies for change-conditioning
new prison and jail beds upon compliance with modest programming
expansion. Aimed at producing critical improvement, such approaches could implement a useful reform. However, useful reform
requires that we first address fundamental flaws in criminal justice.
My perspective is that of a trial judge, having sentenced offenders
since 1990 in the midst of a cruelly dysfunctional sentencing culture.
Yes, there have been some commendable advances in the area of
treatment courts, 4 and our probation and corrections partners have
growing appreciation for the promise of evidence-based responses to
crime. 5 Pretrial release hearings and dangerous offender proceedings
are expected to produce a well-informed and rationally crafted result
that serves the welfare of the community. Some states have made attempts to adopt strategies introducing evidence-based practices into
sentencing in general. 6 Nevertheless, profound deficits stubbornly
3. A more inclusive objective is harm reduction, which includes both reduced victimizations and a reduction in punishments which oppress offenders without achieving any
legitimate social function. See Michael Marcus, Responding to the Model Penal Code Sentencing
Revisions: Tips for Early Adopters and Power Users, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 86-137 (2007)
[hereinafter Marcus, Responding to the MPC].
4. See NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJusTICE, DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND DECADE (2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/211081.pdf.
5. See Brad Bogue et al., Crime and justice Inst., Implementing Evidence-based Practice in Community Corrections (2004), available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2004/
019342.pdf; Edward J. Latessa, The Challenge of Change: CorrectionalPrograms and EvidenceBased Practices, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 547, 551, 554-57 (2004); Doris Layton MacKenzie, Corrections and Sentencing in the 21st Century: Evidence-Based Correctionsand Sentencing,
81 PRISONJ. 299, 306 (2001); Michael Marcus, Sentencing Support Tools and Probationin Multnomah County, CT. REV., Winter 2004, at 16, available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/
cr40_3and4/CR40-3Marcus.pdf; Michael Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of Denunciation:
CriminalJustice's Weakest Link, 1 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 671, 674 (2004) [hereinafter Marcus,
Temple of Denunciation];Todd R. Clear et al., Evidence-Based Policies and Practices: Making
the Case That Research Can Provide What Criminal Justice Policymakers Need, Plenary
Panel at the Nat'l Inst. ofJustice Conference (July 18, 2005) (conference agenda available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/events/nij-conference/2005/agenda.pdf).
6. See, e.g., Michael Marcus, Smart Sentencing: Public Safety, Public Trust and Confidence
Through Evidence-Based Dispositions, in NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUTURE TRENDS IN
STATE COURTS 2006, at 56 (Carol R. Flango ed., 2006), available at http://
www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KISCtFutuTrendsO6.pdf; Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82
IND. L.J. 1307 (2007), available at http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/53/1/Evidence-Based-Practices-and-State-Sentencing-Policy-Ten-Policy-Initiatives-to-Reduce-Recidivism/Pagel.htrnl. Devising such strategies is the mission of the National Institute of
Corrections' National Advisory Committee on Evidence Based Decision Making for Local
Court Systems, which last met in November 2007.
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persist in mainstream sentencing: most sentences are imposed with no
responsible attempt to choose a disposition that is most likely to reduce recidivism. 7 Most offenders sentenced for most crimes will offend again.8 A great many offenders sentenced for serious crimes have
prior convictions with sentences imposed with no responsible effort to
prevent future crimes. As a result, our recidivism rates continue at
unacceptably high levels. 9 Most offenders in jail or prison have been
in jail or on probation before.1 0 Violent crime rates have generally
declined 11 while prison populations continue to grow 12 at rates that
challenge our ability to afford other social services such as higher education, public health, and intervention programs-services that are
13
more likely to reduce crime than criminal justice at its best.
7. Beyond the notable exception of treatment courts and the more enlightened juvenile delinquency courts, sentencing thought and practice focuses on blameworthiness and
criminal history, aggravation and mitigation, and, as a last resort, largely feigned consistency. See, e.g., Marcus, Justitia's Bandage, supra note 2, at 1-2; see also Michael Marcus,
Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices PublicSafety: What's Wrong and How We Can Fix It, 16 FED.
SENT'G REP. 76 (2003); Michael Marcus, Comments on the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Preliminary Draft No. 1, 30 Am.J. CRIM. L. 135, 155 n.66 (2003) [hereinafter Marcus, Comments on
the MPC]; Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3.
8. "Of the 272,111 persons released from prisons in 15 States in 1994, an estimated
67.5% were rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within 3 years, 46.9% were
reconvicted, and 25.4% resentenced to prison for a new crime. The 272,111 offenders
discharged in 1994 accounted for nearly 4,877,000 arrest charges over their recorded careers." BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS (2007), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm.
9. See id.
10. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW,U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PROFILE OFJAIL INMATES 1 (1998),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pji96.pdf ("More than 7 of every 10jail
inmates had prior sentences to probation or incarceration. Over 4 in 10 had served 3 or
more sentences."). Figures from 2002 are similar: only 27% of jail inmates had no prior
incarceration or probation. DoRsJ. JAMES, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES

6 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjiO2.pdf.
11.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME

LEVELS DECLINED SINCE 1993 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/cv2.htm.

12.

See, e.g.,

SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: THIRTY-THREE CONSEC,

UTIVE YEARS OF GROWTH (2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/
Documents/publications/inc-newfigures.pdf; JENIFER WARREN, THE PEW CTR. ON THE
ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 (2008), available at http://
Proponents of
www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in%20100.pdf.
prison claim credit for declining crime rates, while proponents of rehabilitation cite the
same rates as reasons why we should not be building more prisons. There is wisdom and
folly in both camps; the trick is to capture the wisdom and discard the folly.
13. See, e.g., PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., RAND CORP., DIVERTING CHILDREN FROM A
LIFE OF CRIME (1998) (research brief available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/researchbriefs/RB4010/indexl. html); Sharon Mihalic et al., Blueprintsfor Violence Prevention,
Jtv. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Just. & Delinquency Prevention, Washington, D.C.),
July 2001, at 1, 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/187079.pdf; STEVE Aos
ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLIcY OPTIONS To
STATES,
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Worst of all, mainstream sentencing results in victimizations of
citizens by repeat offenders that a smarter approach would prevent. In
addition, it imposes cruelty upon offenders in the name ofjustice with
no outcome other than oppression and dysfunction, 14 and no impact
of any positive social value.
Because sentencing drives the lion's share of correctional and
probation resources,' 5 we need to fix what is wrong with sentencing
before we can achieve substantial improvement in the rest of criminal
justice. Doing more of the same-more prison, more programs-will
not alter the brutality imposed by recidivist crimes and irresponsible
allocation of prison resources. Just as twelve-step programs teach that
it is insane to persist in behaviors while expecting outcomes to
change' 6 we need to change our behaviors before we can expect improved results.
REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES 17
(2001), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-10-1201.pdf, Ross Home] et al.,
The Pathways to Prevention Project: Doing Developmental Prevention in a Disadvantaged Community, TRENDS & ISSUES CRIME & CRIM. JUST. (Australian Inst. of Criminology, Canberra,
Austl.), Aug. 2006, at 1, 1, available at http://www.griffith.edu.au/_data/assets/pdffile/
0016/13372/trends.pdf; MARGARET SHAW, INT'L CTR. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME, COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO URBAN CRIME PREVENTION FOCUSING ON YOUTH (2007), availableat
http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/publications/pub-188- .pdfPHPSESSID=bfbc4c4e
5fl 7c426baf44b9ea8f06eb4; see also A Bibliography for Parenting Education Programs and
Their Effectiveness, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/prevent/parenting/rbib.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). An Oregon colleague,Judge Pamela Abernethy,
has launched a program called "Project Bond" that combines both sectors: parents of very
young children who appear as criminal defendants are given sentencing incentives to
agree to injecting services into their parenting.
14. The reality of prisons does not diminish through our efforts to hide it from view.
Weaker inmates are commonly controlled by physical brutality, subjected to sexual assault,
and forced to submit to a culture whose operative values are antithetical to the prosocial
values that free society largely relies upon for safety and order: empathy and shared values
respecting the rights and persons of fellow citizens. Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra
note 3, at 71.
15. It is sentencing, of course, that places people in prison or on probation or postprison supervision. Even those awaiting a hearing on a probation or post-prison release
charge would not be in that position without a previous sentence. Those incapacitated
prior to trial are not the primary targets of probation and correctional resources, although
some enlightened jurisdictions have begun to understand that they represent a worthy
target of attempts to address criminogenic needs. As of mid-2007, defendants awaiting adjudication of new criminal charges represent about 400,000 of the 2.3 million prison and
jail inmates in the United States. See Press Release, Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Slower Growth in the Nation's Prison and Jail Populations Uune 6, 2008), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/pimO7jimO7pr.htm.
16. This maxim has been attributed to several important thinkers, including Albert
Einstein, Benjamin Franklin, Rudyard Kipling, and Rita Mae Brown, and probably derives
from a Chinese proverb.
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The vast bulk of attention to crime and sentencing ignores some
core realities that we must recognize and confront-four 800-pound
gorillas hiding in the midst of criminal justice: just deserts as the only
requirement of sentencing ensures its continued failure; all sentences
impact public safety; punishments that fit the crime instead of the offender cannot succeed; and nothing will change unless we redirect
plea bargaining. Because it does not deal with these realities, Assembly
Bill 900, like other peripheral measures such as sentencing guidelines
and mandatory minimums, will only perpetuate avoidable recidivism,
brutality, and waste of criminal justice resources.
I. just Deserts Is Not Enough
All seem to agree that "the punishment should fit the crime" in
the sense that proportionality should set at least an upper limit to
17
punishment and perhaps a lower limit as well. The traditional call is
for 'just deserts," although some now18couch the demand in terms of
"accountability" and "consequences."' The problem with mainstream
criminal justice is that those who impose sentences and those who argue sentencing issues labor under the tremendously destructive notion that it is sufficient to produce a sentence that is lawful and does
not offend proportionality by its perceived punitiveness. Even the august American Law Institute is willing to accept feigned proportionality as sufficient sentencing performance in its pending revision to the
9
Model Penal Code-to the exclusion of public safety.' A small minority of judges and writers actually proclaim that reducing recidivism is
20
not the task of the courts. In contrast, most judges earnestly wish to

17. As I have argued before, the extent to which just deserts sets a minimum level
should be determined by the evidence that punishment is needed "to serve a legitimate
need of a victim, to prevent vigilantism or private retribution, to maintain respect for legitimate authority, or to enhance respect for the persons, property, or rights of others." Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3, at 78-80, 84-85, 90.
Just deserts" connotes the punitive aspects of sentencing. It is what most people
18.
seem to think of when they talk of "punishment," although the latter phrase is less specific,
and may even be used as a synonym for "sentence." When some call for "accountability" or
"consequences," they may be invoking retribution, but may also simply be asking that we
respond to the crime in a manner that makes the victim whole and improves the behavior
of the offender. Further discussion usually removes any ambiguity.
19. Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3, at 72-78.
Paul H. Robinson, PunishingDangerousness: Cloaking PreventativeDetention
20. See, e.g.,
as CriminalJustice, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1429 (2001). Judge Kevin Burke of Hennepin County
was a keynote speaker at the Oregon Judicial Conference in October 2007; he also coauthored KEVIN BURKE & STEVE LEBEN, Am.JUDGES ASs'N, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A KEY
INGREDIENT

IN PUBLIC SATISFACTION

(2007),

available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/htdocs/

AJAWhitePaper9-26-07.pdf. Judge Burke gave a motivational speech to the effect that
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improve the future conduct of those they sentence. But the behavior
of all participants-judges and advocates-follows a working consensus that lawful just deserts is enough. We wallow in what offenders
deserve based on their blameworthiness and criminal history and the
harm they inflicted or threatened. The vast majority of sentences flow
from plea bargains that predict how judges would sentence offenders
without a plea agreement. 2 1 In turn, the sentences that serve as real or
supposed examples are those arrived at by judges who weigh aggravation and mitigation, outrage and sympathy, and perhaps, resources.
There is almost never any responsible attention to public safety outcomes in the examples or in the flow of plea bargains that reflect
them.22

Assembly Bill 900 essentially would add incapacitative and some
rehabilitative resources to California's correctional arsenal, but its potential for public good is crippled by its failure to challenge the pervasively destructive reign ofjust deserts in sentencing.
A.

Just Deserts Thwarts Best Efforts at Crime Reduction

The uninitiated might infer that we have institutionalized routine
sentencing packages for routine cases in order to accomplish crime
judges should all pursue perfection, that 99.5% would never be enough, and so forth. I was
pleased to see some judicial jaws drop when Judge Burke announced that the first court
performance measure decision in his county was not to measure recidivism. Some Oregon
judges oppose recidivism as a court performance measure with arguments that with restrictions of law and resources we should not be responsible for outcomes. As long as we have
choices, those choices have outcomes, and we are surely responsible for best efforts to
promote the best outcomes. The argument that public safety is not an objective of sentencing is unavailable in Oregon as a matter of law. OR. CONST. art. I, § 15.
21. See, e.g., In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 752-53 (Cal. 1992); William Rhodes, Plea
Bargaining:Its Effect on Sentencing and Convictions in the District of Columbia, 70J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1973).
22. "Responsible" sentencing is rationally based on best evidence, as developed infra,
as opposed to whim, folklore, habit, personal philosophy, mere presumption, or untested
convention. See generally Kristin L. Caballero, Blended Sentencing: A Good Idea for Juvenile Sex
Offenders?, 19 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 379 (2005); Steven L. Chanenson, Sentencing
and Data: The Not-So-Odd Couple, 16 FED. SENT'G RPT. 1 (2003); Nancy Gertner, Sentencing
Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569 (2005); Marc L. Miller, A Map of
Sentencing and a Compass forJudges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next
Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351 (2005); Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and
Sentencing Reform, 96J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to
Retribution, 7 BUFF. CPrM. L. REV. 17 (2003); Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the
CriminalLaw, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121 (2005); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudenceof Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2003); David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand the RehabilitativeRole of the Criminal, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743 (2005);James Q. Whitman, A Plea
Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (2003).
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reduction where possible. 2 3 From my experience on the bench, I
know that we tend to send thieves to theft talk, bullies to anger management (or domestic violence counseling), substance abusers (and
drunk drivers) to substance abuse treatment, and sex offenders to behavior modification. 24 But in my view, this is a facade; it is symmetry,

not science. We make the punishment "fit the crime" rather than
making any responsible effort to reduce crime. The proof is largely in
what we do not do.
First, we generally make no effort to track whether any of these
dispositions work. We do not measure the success of these dispositions
based upon their performance or that of their graduates. We may
track whether the offender completes the program, which is what we
deem to be success. 2 5 As an outcome measure, attendance alone is

entirely consistent with just deserts, because attendance is part of the
punishment exacted for the offense. But mere attendance is wholly
unsatisfactory as a public safety measure-a drunk driver who completes treatment is no success if she or he subsequently drinks, drives,
and kills. A thief who steals again cannot be called a success by a rational society simply because he actually attended "theft talk" and
completed probation on his previous theft conviction before committing his new crimes.
Second, we do not assign these dispositions based on offender
risk and needs assessments, but rather based on the crime for which
the offender is being sentenced. 26 One thief s criminality may be best
addressed by cognitive restructuring, another's by addiction treatment, but we send both to "theft talk." In other words, we fit the crime
instead of fitting the offender.
Throughout sentencing-within and beyond the range of the
lesser crimes for which we routinely assign programs as part of the
sentence-even judges who most earnestly desire to protect the public, and if possible, to reform the offender, are crippled by this prevailing sentencing culture. Neither prosecutors nor defenders come
equipped to argue what sentence within the range of lawfully available
dispositions is most likely to reduce the offender's future criminal
conduct. If pressed to participate in such an analysis, attorneys-once
23. As argued below, it is also a drastic mistake to assume that we have no impact on
public safety outcomes by the choices that we make in more serious dispositions, which
commonly include substantial prison terms.
24. See, e.g., Marcus, Justitia's Bandage, supra note 2, at 3.
25. Id. at 3-4.
26. Id.
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they overcome their surprise-resort to deserts analysis or make something up out of the rich collection of homilies that judges sometimes
articulate as a substitute for evidence-based analysis: "the defendant
needs some time in a cell to think about making better decisions";
"offenders will not change until they are ready for change"; "sentencing is intuitive"; "if we make this unpleasant enough, the defendant
will think twice about repeating this conduct"; "let the punishment fit
the crime"; "we need to send a message. 2 7
This claptrap provides no assistance to a judge who wants to pursue best efforts at crime reduction, and it is no substitute for responsible sentencing. Best intentions are no substitute for best efforts.
Without evidence and rational argument, judges typically rely on folklore, habit, local convention, or personal predilections and experience wholly divorced from any empirical support. Even probation
officers who are well read in the fields of criminology and corrections,
risk and needs assessment, and stage of change analysis 28 abandon the
world of science when they enter our world-our "temples of denun27. These utterings are all too familiar to criminal law practitioners. They rarely reach
appellate opinions except when an appeal concerns a prosecutor's argument to the jury.
Judges' comments usually remain untranscribed in what passes for an official record of
proceedings at the trial level, even if there are exceptions. See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 975 So.
2d 646, 655-56 (La. 2007) (deeming judge's maximum sentence for looting to "send a
message" unconstitutionally excessive); U.S. v. Butler, 252 Fed. Appx. 150 (9th Cir. 2007)
(affirming 216-month sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver as within
judge's discretion "to ensure that the punishment fit the crime"); State v. Khuth, No.
CR05122819, 2007 WL 2570453, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2007) (affirming assault sentence of 20 years fashioned to "send a message in this community that this sort of
behavior will not be tolerated"). When I was chided by our local newspaper for a sentence
it deemed insufficient to "show" that the defendant's behavior would not be "tolerated," I
was given the courtesy of an op-ed reply. See Michael Marcus, Op-Ed., Sentencefor Safety, Not
for Message, OREGONIAN, Oct. 1, 2003, available at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/
homepages/smmarcus/safetynotshow.html. As submitted, the piece was entitled "Sentence
for Safety, Not for Show," but the omnipotent headline writer left his mark.
28. "Stage of Change" analysis discards the pretense of so many who evade responsibility for the public safety outcomes of sentencing by pretending that no one can change
unless he or she is "ready." ScoTr T. WALTERS ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE FOR
PROBATION AND PAROLE 14 (2007), availableat http://nicic.org/Downloads/PDF/Library/
022253.pdf. Competent response to crime requires that we recognize that "[pleople can
range from having no interest in making changes (precontemplation), to having some
awareness or mixed feelings about change (contemplation), to preparing for change
(preparation), to having recently begun to make changes (action), to maintaining changes
over time (maintenance)." Id. Walters continues that "[o]ffenders in the earlier stages are
less interested in change and may feel more coerced into acting, whereas offenders in the
later stages are more interested in change for their own reasons." Id. Thus, our responsibility is to identify an offender's stage of change and to respond with strategies for behavior
modification in light of that stage.
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ciation. '' 29 Probation reports may speak of "forfeiting the privilege of
probation," and sentencing hearings are about "holding the probationer accountable" by imposing "consequences for probation violations." 3 0 While probation may or may not be a privilege, we are
squandering the resources involved unless we deploy them efficiently
as a means of reducing criminal behavior. "Consequences" in the
form ofjail, prison, or alternative sanctions are often appropriate, but
we are not using them wisely unless an evidence-based analysis suggests that they are reasonably likely of success.
All of this must change dramatically if we are to hope for any
improvement in criminal justice. First and foremost, while just deserts
properly provides limits of proportionality, it is wholly insufficient as a
purpose of sentencing or as a measure of its success. Worse, its role is
typically profoundly destructive because it serves as a shield against
accountability for outcomes. States (and countries) with and without
guidelines accept sentencing as sufficient if it "fits the crime" and is
within lawful and conventional limits of severity. We will fail to make
significant progress as long as a sentence that is merely lawful and
proportionate in severity is therefore beyond reproach.
B.

Just Deserts Swells Prisons with Virtually No Attention to Public
Safety

Sentencing guidelines typically codify the notion that public
safety is not even part of the equation; mandatory or advisory guidelines commonly propose imprisonment ranges based on crime seriousness and criminal history, with no pretense of attention to
outcomes. 3 ' Their primary value lies in reduced sentencing disparity
29. See generally Marcus, Temple of Denunciation,supra note 5. We have made significant
progress locally; our probation officers have begun to discuss evidence-based practices, risk
and needs assessment, and stage of change analysis in probation reports and probation
violation hearings.
30. Before wejoined forces with managers in our probation department to encourage
more useful communications, I received hundreds of such comments in probation reports.
These misguided missives, like many sentencing utterings by judges, are rarely published
beyond those reports. On occasion, these notions are reflected in appellate decisions. See,
e.g., Adams v. State, 979 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla. 2008) (holding that probation is a "privilege"
that the court has discretion to revoke). I submit we would be better served by managing
probation resources with the understanding that they should be used to accomplish crime
reduction, rather than by worrying about whether the offender deserves a "privilege."
31. Oregon's guidelines mention recidivism with respect to three out of ninety-nine
gridblocks, OR. ADMIN. R. 213-005-0006(1) (2008), and otherwise distribute prisons based
on crime seriousness, criminal history, aggravation, and mitigation. See OR. ADMIN. R. 213002-0001(3) (d) (2008) ("Subject to the discretion of the sentencing judge to deviate and
impose a different sentence in recognition of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
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and control over prison resources. But guidelines achieve consistency
largely by ignoring differences that should matter. 32 They surely have
not improved crime reduction. Though they have slowed prison
growth, they certainly have not impeded our expanding leadership in
the proportion of our population we relegate to prison. 33
This is not merely a budget problem. 3 4 One of the many realities
of our dysfunction is that for some offenders, prison actually increases
their overall criminal behavior. With some exceptions, 3 5 recidivism rates

for medium- and low-risk offenders commonly increase after prison, 3 6
while imprisonment does not seem to increase recidivism rates for
37
high-risk offenders.
Ignoring even these broad consequences, we determine who to
send to prison (and for how long and under what conditions) based
overwhelmingly upon fundamentalist notions ofjust deserts-abstractions ultimately about how angry we think we should be-tempered
the appropriate punishment for a felony conviction should depend on the seriousness of
the crime of conviction when compared to all other crimes and the offender's criminal
history.").
32. Marcus, Comments on the MPC, supra note 7, at 155 n.66.
33. The United States leads the world in the proportion of its population that it imprisons. WARREN, supra note 12, at 5.
34. Smarter sentencing is also demanded by fiscal integrity, particularly since most
demand for expensive prison beds is created by recidivism. See Marcus, Justitia's Bandage,
supra note 2, at 4.
35. See OR. DEP'T OF CORR., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNITY-BASED SANCTIONS IN
REDUCING RECIDIVISM 2, 18, 25, tbl.3 (2002), available at http://egov.oregon.gov/DOC/
TRANS/CC/docs/pdf/effectiveness_of sanctionsversion2.pdf (reporting results of Oregon study and review of national literature). Most notably, some sex offender cohorts exhibit the same rate of recidivism after incarceration as comparable sex offenders sent to
alternatives or community based supervision. Id.; see generally MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., SEX
OFFENDER RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA (2007), available at http://www.corr.state.mn.us/documents/04-07SexOffenderReport-Recidivism.pdf; PATRICK LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
36. See Kovandzic et al., When Prisoners Get Out: The Impact of Prison Releases on Homicide
Rates, 1975-1999, 15 CRIM. JUST. PoCv REv. 212, 213-14 (2004); Todd R. Clear, Backfire:
When IncarcerationIncreases Crime, 3J. OKLA. CRIM. JUST. RES. CONSORTIUM 7 (1996), available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/offenders/ocjrc/96/Backfire.pdf); PAULA SMITH ET AL.,
CTR. FOR CRIM. JUSTICE STUDIES, THE EFFECTS OF PRISON SENTENCES AND INTERMEDIATE

RECIDIVISM 4-5 (2002), available at http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publications/corrections/200201_Gendreau-e.pdf; LIN SONG & ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY, RECIDIVISM: THE EFFECT OF INCARCERATION AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED (1993),
available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/IncarcRecid.pdf; The Effects of Punishment on
Recidivism, RES. SUMMARY (Solicitor Gen. of Canada, Ontario, Canada), May 2002, at 1,
available at http://www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/corrections/pdf/2OO205e.pdf (reporting
meta analysis of 111 studies).
37. OR. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 35, at 2.
SANCTIONS ON
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only by budgetary restraints.3 8 We eschew science and betray public
safety in the resulting allocation of prison resources. While AB 900
39
contemplates the use of risk and needs assessment after sentencing,
science would employ best efforts at risk and needs assessment as well
at the level of sentencing, instead of reserving it only for those we
send to prison whether or not they belong in prison in rational pursuit of public safety. As a result offenders we should not be locking up
for significant periods (or at all) often recidivate and cause more victimizations. Most offenders return to the community well within the
remaining term of their potential criminal careers, 40 and many more
41
than make up for lost time soon after their release from prison.
Many return to prison with new crimes when wiser dispositions would
have diverted them from prison altogether and spared their victims
the crimes we should have prevented. By misusing prison in this way,
we exacerbate prison overcrowding. Having squandered prison resources, we fail to adequately protect the public from others we
should have locked up longer. Moreover, if we are diverting to prison
budgets public safety dollars that would otherwise fund programs ef38.
States, 3
39.
sections
sections
40.

See, e.g., Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United
14-15 (2001).
See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15819.40-.41 (Deering Supp. 2008) (codifying AB 900
2 and 3); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3020, 3105, 6270 (Deering 2008) (codifying AB 900
11, 13, and 16).
PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 9,

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

GROWTH IN STATE PRISON

(2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/growth.htm ("At
least 95% of all State prisoners will be released from prison at some point; nearly 80% will
be released to parole supervision.").
41. See sources cited supra note 8. AB 900 commendably addresses some of this problem by encouraging responsible attention to reintegration. See statutes cited supra note 39.
Assigning the right programs to the right inmates, insisting on evidence-based best practices, and rigorous performance measurement based on recidivism might actually significandy reduce the harm we do by misallocating prison beds, and might also improve the
performance of those whose imprisonment is consistent with evidence-based practices. But
improved reintegration alone is no substitute for insisting that sentencing produce a far
more rational allocation of prison beds based on evidence-based best practices in pursuit
of public safety; there are many offenders whose criminal behavior is more effectively reduced by non-prison sentences, and there are others who should be incapacitated for
longer than the terms allocated without evidence-based best practices. See OR. DEP'T OF
CORR., supra note 35, at 2; see also sources cited supra note 36; Marcus, Responding to the
MPC, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing how Oregon's guidelines overincarcerate about a
third, underincarcerate another third, and correctly incarcerate the remaining third of
Oregon prisoners based on risk of crime in the community). Furthermore, funding reintegratioh programs (and providing inmates with incentives to participate in programs) is no
guarantee of success. Surely criminal justice is a shining example of the reality that things
do not work simply because they "should" work. None of this can do any good without
rigorous outcome measures and evidence-based assignments of dispositions to the offenders for whom they have the highest need and potential for success in those dispositions.
AND PAROLE POPULATION
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fective at reducing recidivism, we are also generating additional candidates for prison beds by failing to reduce their criminal behavioreven before they qualify for those beds. Building more prisons without
profound change will surely increase our production of recidivists
through both mechanisms. Prison expansion, ultimately, is a major cause
of prison expansion.
Misallocation of prison beds imposes grave performance limits on
measures such as Assembly Bill 900 that concentrate on post-prison
performance. 42 Ignoring public safety at the front end means that we
are loading prisons with offenders whose public safety impact would
be better addressed elsewhere. To this extent, we are exacerbating the
very problems we later seek to mitigate through reintegration efforts
while diverting resources from those who should be imprisoned
longer. And to the extent that public safety demands longer terms for
some offenders moderated by just deserts and resource limitations,
reintegration is inherently an inadequate response. 43 Either way, reintegration efforts may mitigate, but can never solve, the problem that
we use prison primarily for punishment instead of crime reduction.
C.

just Deserts Obscures Any Clear Purpose for Criminal Justice

The dysfunction of criminal justice is vividly apparent in our failure to arrive at a coherent vision of its purpose. The public has consistently understood and preferred that the calling of criminal law is
public safety. 44 Some courts have occasionally recognized that "the

protection and safety of the people of the state" is "the most important consideration" underlying laws relating to sentencing. 45 Many
states with statutes based on the 1962 Model Penal Code retain language in purposes provisions that at least includes public safety as an
objective of sentencing. 46 Even with such statutes, public safety is at
42. See supra note 41.
43. A rational system would not generally incapacitate offenders whose susceptibility
to reformation and risk level renders community-based dispositions the best strategy for
harm reduction.
44. Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3, at 80 n.40.
45. Tuel v. Gladden, 379 P.2d 553, 555 (Or. 1963).
46. The Model Penal Code of 1962, adopted in some form by the vast majority of
states, lists the first purposes of sentencing as "(a) to prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders; (c) to safeguard offenders
against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment." MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (1962). Oregon's version still begins with the declaration that the purpose of adopting Oregon's version of the Model Penal Code, among other goals, is "[t]o
insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent
influence of the sentences authorized, the correction and rehabilitation of those con-
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best one of an unprioritized list of optional considerations, with no
meaningful attempt to ensure its pursuit. 47 Since the spread of the

1962 Code, its faith-based optimism for rehabilitation was destroyed
by early empirical analysis that gutted the medical model 48 and fueled
ubiquitous surrender to just deserts to the exclusion of "utilitarian"
objectives such as crime reduction. In California, this was the "significant change in .

.

. penal philosophy" 4 9 reflected in the adoption of

the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, which flatly "declare[d]"
that "the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment. ' 50 In response, the guidelines movement essentially abandoned any purpose
other than regularity in pursuit of just deserts (and resource management) .51 Sadly, even the American Law Institute is now well on its way
to modifying the Model Penal Code to drop public safety from the
52
purposes to be pursued with incapacitation.
In recent years, victims' groups have had to remind us that public
safety is the object of criminal justice and have attempted to reintroduce the notion into our laws. 53 Organized victims' efforts have also
victed, and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection." OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.025(1)(a) (2007). The Model Penal Code's purposes of sentencing are
also now reflected in CAL. R. CT. 4.410, which was adopted in 1977, after the Legislature
declared that "the purpose of imprisonment is punishment." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170(a) (1) (Deering 2008). Rule 4.410 states that the purposes of sentencing are:
(1) Protecting society; (2) Punishing the defendant; (3) Encouraging the defendant to lead a law-abiding life in the future and deterring him or her from future
offenses; (4) Deterring others from criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences; (5) Preventing the defendant from committing new crimes by isolating
him or her for the period of incarceration; (6) Securing restitution for the victims
of crime; and (7) Achieving uniformity in sentencing.
CAL. R. CT. 4.410.
47. See Kevin Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 525, 258-59 (2002). Professor Reitz's apt criticism of a "shopping
list" of purposes in the 1962 Code disappeared from his subsequent attempts to adapt his
revision to a host of concerns excluding best efforts at public safety. See Marcus, Responding to
the MPC, supra note 3, at 68-77.
48. The "medical model" of the early and mid-twentieth century posited that criminal
behavior is the result of a disorder that should respond to treatment. See, e.g., GEORGE F.
COLE & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 254-55 (2004).
49. In re Eric J., 601 P.2d 549, 554 (Cal. 1979).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (Deering 2008).
51. See Marcus, Comments on the MPC, supra note 7.
52. Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3, at 73-74.
53. In re Dannenberg, 104 P.3d 783 (Cal. 2005) (discussing the various ways in which
California voters have promoted considerations of public safety). Proposition 8, popularly
known as "The Victims' Bill of Rights," amended the California Constitution to recognize
procedural rights for victims and substantive changes related to parole, but expressed "the
more basic expectation that persons who commit felonious acts ... will be ... sufficiently
punished so that the public safety is protected and encouraged as a goal of highest impor-
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brought us mandatory minimum, three-strikes, and similar laws that
rely on extended incapacitation. 54 These were promoted in large part
because they responded to real or perceived public safety deficits of
the sentencing behaviors they modified. 55 However draconian and destructive of judicial discretion these devices may be in some applications, they represent a reasonable public response to our failure to
accept accountability for public safety when we impose sentences. At
least for many of the violent offenders targeted by such laws, lengthy
incapacitation is indeed the only result that best serves crime reduction. 5 6 But these measures paint with too broad a brush, widening the
net to include many whose criminal behavior we could more effectively reduce with other methods and whose total criminal output will
ultimately be increased by prison when they return to their communities. 5 7 Further, by conflating retribution with public safety, these
methods perpetuate the destructive fallacy that severity and effectiveness are directly proportional. 58 As with prison allocation by just
tance." See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; see also STATE OF CAL., CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET:
PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 18, 1982, at 33 (1982), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/
ballotpdf/1982p.pdf. To the same end, Proposition 8 addressed repeat offenders by adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (Deering 2008), which has been variously amended and is
known as a "Three Strikes" law. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 278 (Cal. 1982).
Victims have had similar impact in Oregon, where Ballot Measure 11 mandated minimum
and enhanced sentences for various categories of crimes. See OR. CONST. art. I, §15,
amended by OR. REV. STAT. § 137.700 (2007) (listing "protection of society" first among
purposes of sentencing). Oregon voters also passed Ballot Measure 40, popularly known as
the "Crime Victims' Rights" initiative. See OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 42-45; see also, e.g., JOHN
CLARK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT": A REVIEW OF STATE

(1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/165369.pdf; ARK. CODE
§ 16-90-804 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 9210016 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4701 (2003);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-134016 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (West 2007).
54. "Mandatory minimums" require a judge to impose at least a specified minimum
sentence for a given crime, typically with no reduction for "good time" or any other form
of early release. Oregon's provisions are a good example. See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.700
(2007). "Three strikes" sentencing laws typically mandate a lengthy sentence after the third
conviction for any of a defined category of crimes-even if the third offense is objectively a
relatively minor offense. For example, see California's version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 667
(Deering 2008).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a); In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985);
55. See, e.g.,
Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982); OR. SEc'v OF STATE, OREGON 1994 GENERAL
ELECTION VOTERS' PAMPHLET 45-55 (1994).
56. Unlike most medium and low-risk offenders, high-risk offenders generally show
no incremental increase in recidivism in correlation with extended incarceration. OR.
DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 35, at 18, 25, tbl.3.
57. Id.; see sources cited supra note 36.
58. See generally Marcus, Justitia's Bandage, supra note 2. Mandatory minimum and
three-strikes provisions have other negative consequences as well, such as providing enormous bargaining power to prosecutors which may, in some applications, actually deter the
LEGISLATION 1
ANN.
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deserts, mandatory minimum and three-strikes approaches divert to
prisons financial and policy support for effective programs and alternatives-along with some or many offenders whose risk would be
more responsibly managed with such programs and alternatives.
We are left with a lack of accountability lurking within notions
that "the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment" instead of
crime reduction, and with unprioritized "shopping lists" of purposes
such as those contained in Rule 4.410. 5 9 The tension between the
objectives of retribution and crime reduction cannot be avoided by
suggesting that "punishment" in these proclamations is the equivalent
of "sentencing," or that they beg the question of what is the purpose
of "punishment," which may at least include public safety. For example, one California court reasoned:
[W]hile the terms of confinement provided by determinate sentencing law are intended as punitive [see Cal. Penal Code
§ 1170(a) (1)], the purposes of parole are "successful reintegration
of the offender into society and to positive citizenship . . . in the
interest of public safety."6 0
Some courts have labored bravely to reconcile the punitive and
utilitarian notions of criminal justice. Bundled within such utterances
as "[t]he primary purpose of all punishment ... is the protection of
society," 6' these courts occasionally assume that a utilitarian objective
such as incapacitation, general or specific deterrence, or reformation
is served by incarceration. Still, incarceration fails the same tests 6 2 as
our typical use of programs for lesser crimes: we generally make no
effort to track whether any prison terms of any length or under any
circumstances work once the offender is released back into the community. Surely, they prevent crimes on the outside while tle offendei
is inside, but we do not compare the total criminal output of offenders
of similar risk with and without imprisonment throughout their potential criminal careers. We ignore the overwhelming evidence that
some offenders make up for lost time after imprisonment due to the
63
criminogenic impact of prison.
innocent from exercising their right to trial. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers
and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 passim (2006).
59. CAL. R. CT. 4.410.
60. Gomez v. Appellate Dep't, 183 Cal. Rptr. 577, 583-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
61. One example is State v. Lawler, 927 P.2d 99, 106 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). See also Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
62. See Marcus, Justitia's Bandage,supra note 2, at 3-4; see also supra text accompanying
notes 25-26.
63. See sources cited supra notes 36-37.
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We do not assign offenders to lengths of imprisonment based on
offender risk and needs assessments, but rather based on the crime
for which the offender is being sentenced. Often, we fit the crime
instead of fitting the offender, as we do with programs allocated by
symmetry to the exclusion of science at lower levels of crime. 64 Under
Oregon guidelines, for instance, prison terms are presumptive as a
matter of criminal history and crime seriousness, with possible deviation based upon "aggravation" and "mitigation. ' 65 This flaw is precisely the same under California's Determinate Sentencing Law,
where the Legislature has fixed ranges based on just deserts notions of
crime seriousness and directs judges to choose a sentence within a
range based essentially upon aggravation (including enhancement by
criminal history) and mitigation factors 6 6-all to the practical exclusion of anything approaching evidence- or risk-based analysis.
D.

Just Deserts Ignores Evidence-Based Practices

"Evidence-based practices" are sweeping the ranks of the courts'
criminal justice partners, as probation and corrections professionals
such as Robert Martinson have emerged from the fallacy that "nothing works. ' 67 As they have discovered, what Martinson and others
learned was not that programs were hopeless, but that programs do
not work just because we want them to, or just because we posit that
they should. Serious study, competent research, and rigorous attention to learning and applying what matters have produced some modalities that have demonstrable and dramatic impact on the
criminality of substantial cohorts of the criminal justice population. 68
"Evidence-based practices" are those that are likely to work for their
intended purposes in view of evidence, data, and research. 69 In the
64. Just as we tend to send lower-level thieves to "theft talk" regardless of whether the
major criminogenic factor is addiction or lack of empathy, we prescribe chronic thieves to
prison terms when some would produce far less crime in the future were we to employ
secure addiction treatment. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
65.

OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0001 to -0002 (2008).

66. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (Deering 2008); CAL. R. CT. 4.420.
67. Robert Martinson is generally charged with suggesting in 1974 that nothing works.
See Robert Martinson, Vat Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT.
22, (1974). Martinson himself retreated from this position, and it has been thoroughly
debunked, at least as a descriptive of the offender population as a whole. See, e.g., James
McGuire, What Works in Reducing Criminality 2 (Aug. 1, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/criminality/mcguire.pdf.
68. Marcus, Justitia'sBandage, supra note 2, at 18-21.
69. See, e.g., ELYSE CLAWSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN CORRECTION S (2005), available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2004/020174.pdf. Oregon legislation adds cost-effectiveness to the definition: "'Evidence-based program' means a
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face of our growing knowledge about what really does make a difference in corrections, the culture of sentencing has largely ignored
these advances, clinging to archaic liturgy in apparent fear of the con70
sequences of accepting accountability for the outcomes we produce.
The bizarre consequence is that we use science in the context of risk
and needs assessment for release decisions before offenders reach the
arena of sentencing, and to determine levels of supervision and programming in custody after sentencing, while sentencing itself proceeds as if left a century behind. As a practical matter, the best of what
corrections has to offer is burdened with having to mitigate the lost
opportunities, misguided allocations of resources, and criminogenic
impacts of misguided sentencing itself.
Beyond the inertia of tradition 7 and the risks of conceding accountability for outcomes, there is a political contour to this quandary. Academia and advocates for evidence-based corrections tend to
focus their attention in the direction of developing and validating effective rehabilitative programs. 72 They largely ignore the darker side
of criminal justice-how best to handle offenders who pose a high risk
of violence or predation, and whose apparent susceptibility to rehabilitation is either none or far too low to justify the risks associated with
substituting treatment for incapacitation. There is precious little published work aiming the principles of rigorous research at maximizing
the efficiency with which we use prison beds to achieve public safety,
although some good work is emerging around the topic of reintegration-how best to respond to the reality that most offenders actually
73
return to society.

The politics of this is that many on the incarcerationist end of the
spectrum view "evidence-based practices" with distrust.74 Their focus is
program that: (a) Incorporates significant and relevant practices based on scientifically
based research; and (b) Is cost effective." OR. REv. STAT. § 182.515(3) (2007).
70. Michael Marcus, Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices Public Safety: What's Wrong and
How We Can Fix It, 16 FED. SENT'G RIP. 76 (2003).
71. Part of the problem with courts is their historical connection to the imposition of
social control through punishment in the service of ruthless autocracies and monarchies.
Marcus, Justitia's Bandage, supra note 2, at 5-7. "The more ancient the abuse, the more
sacred it is." NIGEL REES, BREWER'S FAMOUS QUOTATIONS 5 (2006) (translating and quoting

8 (London, Oxford Univ. 1769)).
Marcus, Justitia'sBandage, supra note 2, at 8-9.
72. See, e.g.,
73. For an extensive library of materials on prisoner re-entry, see National Institute of
Correction, Sources on Offender Reintegration, http://nicic.org/Features/Library/?Tag=
385&Group=7 (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
74. For example, in written testimony recently submitted to the Oregon legislature,
Crime Victims United argued that "[d]espite [Senate Bill 267, which] calls for programming using evidence based practices, we really don't know what works until we apply a
VOLTAIRE, LES GUEBRES
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on the most violent or persistent of offenders. 75 Their notion is that
proponents of evidence-based practices are holdovers from the discredited medical model and liberal apologists who are "soft on crime"
at the expense of victims and the public. 76 I hope that it is too early to
sacrifice the concept of "evidence-based practices" to this divide. In
any event, my use of the concept is agnostic as to the spectrum of
leniency and severity. We need to apply our best efforts to assess the
relative worth of all of our correctional tools-including rehabilitation, alternatives, and incapacitation-to the end of public safety.
What is tough on crime, after all, is that which reduces it. What is tough
on an offender, on the other hand, may but often does not represent
what is most likely to reduce the criminal behavior of that offender.
Comprehensive application of best practices would prescribe community-based responses to some offenders, lengthy incapacitation to
some others, and a rich variety of intelligent responses to the wide
spectrum of offenders we now treat largely as if we were indeed merely
77
a temple of denunciation.
A few states have begun the long but critical path towards evidence-based allocation of prison resources. Virginia has the most welldeveloped program, employing validated risk assessment as a means
of increasing incarceration for some offenders while diverting to community-based corrections offenders who are lesser threats. 78 Missouri
has begun more recently to incorporate risk assessment into its advisory guidelines. 79 Oregon's Criminal Justice Commission proposed a
similar effort for its "mandatory" guidelines, but the Oregon legislature has yet to provide the necessary approval.8 0
proven standard[:] random selection." OregonCatalyst.com, Crime Victims Opposes SB
1087, Supports HB 3638 with Exceptions, http://www.oregoncatalyst.com/index.php?/
archives/] 217-Crime-Victims-United-Legislative-Update.html (Feb. 22, 2008, 11:56 PST).
75. See, e.g., CRIME VICTIMS UNITED, OREGON'S "ALTERNATIVE INCARCERATION PROGRAM"
(2006), http://www.crimevictimsunited.org/issues/corrections/aip.htm.
76. See, e.g., Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Evidence-Based Crime Prevention:
Conclusions and Directionsfor a Safer Society, 47 CANADIANJ. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 337,

339 (2005), available at http://www.utpjournals.com/cjccj/472_article008.pdf.
77. See Marcus, Temple of Denunciation, supra note 5.
78. See BRIANJ. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA (2002), available at http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/risk-off-rpt.pdf.
79. Mo. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM'N, RECOMMENDED SENTENCING: BIENNIAL REPORT
2007 (2007), available at http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file/MOSAC%2Commission%2Report%202007%2OFinal.pdf; Mo. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM'N, RECOMMENDED SENTENCING: REPORT AND IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE JUNE, 2005 (2005), available at http://www.

mosac.mo.gov/file/final%20report2lJune%202005.pdf.
80. The 2005 Oregon legislature directed the Commission to study "whether it is possible to incorporate consideration of reducing criminal conduct" into Oregon's sentencing
guidelines. 2005 Or. Laws 1273 (codifying S.B. 919). This effort produced a bill that would
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Although some have suggested that guidelines accomplish allocation of prison resources by risk because they rely on crime seriousness
and criminal history in prescribing a sentence, they are wrong roughly
two times out of three.8 ' Guidelines were not intended to serve public
82
safety and they do not do so well by accident.
Both sides of the persistent crime and punishment debate resist
empiricism because they fear its results. Incarcerationists fear that researchers will find reasons to divert many from custody, while
rehabilitationists fear that only incapacitation can withstand scrutiny
from a public safety perspective. 83 The tragically absurd result is that
we allocate almost all of our prison beds on the basis ofjust deserts to
the exclusion of any effort to tie the allocation to public safety benefits. The competition between notions of punishment and notions 8of4
public safety is palpable only occasionally in our appellate opinions,
but the consequences deeply impact our communities by spawning
victimizations that smarter allocations would prevent and by removing
from society many whose performance in the community is ultimately
worsened rather than improved by their temporary removal. The first
have broadened discretion under some of Oregon's sentencing guideline blocks while encouraging judges to consider a risk assessment instrument in exercising that discretion.
S.B. 276-4, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). The bill failed in the 2007 Oregon
legislature when its design promised a fiscal impact and late numbers shifted the likely
impact on prison bed demand. The project may continue.
81. Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3, at 78.
82. See OR. ADMIN. R. 213-005-0006(1), -0001(3)(d) (2008).
83. See, e.g., Marcus, Justitia'sBandage, supra note 2, at 14-15.
84. See, e.g., In re Dannenberg, 104 P.3d 783 (Cal. 2005) (illustrating that the public
safety basis to avoid release of an inmate competes with punishment as the exclusive role of
prison). Additional examples are decisions in Oregon which struggle with the tension between a state constitutional provision proscribing retribution. See, e.g., State v. Spinney, 820
P.2d 854, 855-56 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that "'[flaws for the punishment of
crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice" and
that the dominant concern of sentencing guidelines is punishment that is appropriate to
the offense (quoting OR. CONST. art. I, § 15 (amended 1996))). Before guidelines, Oregon
courts repeatedly rejected "vindictive justice" challenges to sentences by invoking "the
most important consideration of all, the protection and safety of the people of the state."
Tuel v. Gladden, 379 P.2d 553, 555 (Or. 1963). The Tuel court explained further, "[s]uch a
principle does not have to be expressed in the constitution as it is the reason for criminal
law." Id. Guidelines, adopted by Oregon in 1989, paid lip service to public safety while
obviously being driven instead by ordered just deserts in tension with prison resources. See
Marcus,Justitia'sBandage,supra note 2, at 8-12; Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3,
at 74-78. In 1996, Oregon voters rewrote the Oregon Constitution to provide: "Laws for
the punishment of crime shall be founded on these principles: protection of society, personal responsibility, accountability for one's actions and reformation." See OR. CoNsT. art.
I, § 15, amended 1byS.J. Res. 32, 68th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1995). Section 16 continues to provide "[c]ruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties
shall be proportioned to the offense." OR. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
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step of meaningful improvement in criminal justice, then, is overcoming this impasse.
It is simply not enough that sentencing avoids disproportionality.
Minimally responsible sentencing demands best efforts within the limits of proportionality to deploy available correctional tools according
to risk, effectiveness, priority, and resource limitations to the end of
public safety. We must identify public safety as our primary goal, 85
responsibly pursue that goal, and accept accountability for our success
or failure as measured by that goal.
To overcome the consequences of decades of retreat to retributivism in the face of the empirical paucity of merely presumed rehabilitation, we must employ a rigorous, evidence-based pursuit of effective
responses to crime and learn to apply what our criminal justice partners have learned in the many decades since the premature proclamation that nothing works. 8 6 The error of merely assuming that we
accomplished crime reduction through any means pales in comparison with the debacle of invoking ordered just deserts to abandon the
most obvious purpose of criminal law. 87 What we must do is accept
and meet the challenge of devising actually effective sentencing
dispositions.
Incarcerationists are correct that public safety demands that some
offenders need to be incapacitated for longer periods than at present.
But they need to accept that public safety also demands that some
offenders be diverted from prison at the outset or sent for shorter
terms-both because we need the beds for those who belong there
and because many offenders are better handled in the community. 88
Rehabilitationists are correct that properly designed and allocated programs and alternatives are far more effective at crime reduction than jail and prison sentences for some offenders. But
rehabilitationists need to accept that programs do not work just because we want them to. We need to be rigorous in vetting programs
for their impact on recidivism and in developing modalities of treat85. A rational system seeks public safety with the limits of law, proportionality, priority
and resource, and rationally compromises that purpose within those limits only as demonstrably necessary to pursue some other legitimate social purpose. The vast majority of
sentences that responsibly seek public safety serve any other social purposes at the same
time; some require adjustment to serve public purposes. See Marcus, Responding to the MPC,
supra note 3, at 79, 90-92, 114-15 (arguing that the legitimate purposes of sentencing
come down to promoting public safety and promoting public values).
86. See Martinson, supra note 67.
87. See generally Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3.
88. See supra notes 35-37, 40 and accompanying text.
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ment for challenging cohorts of offenders. Rehabilitationists also
need to accept that public safety demands that we incapacitate some
offenders within limits of law, proportionality, and resource. This is
because there are offenders for whom nothing else works-offenders
whose criminality will not increase after release from prison, and offenders whose risk of future harm is too high to permit them to remain in the community while we attempt to reduce their criminality.
Every sentencing disposition has consequences for the allocation
of correctional resources, and every sentencing decision has public
safety outcomes regardless of the extent to which we contemplate
those outcomes in the course of constructing sentences. It betrays
public trust and our mission to avoid responsibility for those outcomes
by emphasizing the limitations of law and resource that restrict our
sentencing choices.8 9 We must accept accountability for our role in
reducing or increasing the risk of future harm at the hands of-and
even to-the offender. It is woefully irresponsible to blame offenders
for their recidivism without also accepting responsibility for exercising
best efforts to reduce the likelihood of that recidivism. Best efforts
include measuring our sentencing performance 9 ° and the effective89. Some communities indeed have far fewer program resources than others, and
some have limitations ofjail space and supervision energies. To contend that it is somehow
unfair to assess the impact of our choices within those limits is tantamount to saying we
should not even try to serve public safety. Every judge who handles criminal cases has
substantial discretion in many cases to: choose between jail and prison initially, or upon
finding a violation of probation; choose between consecutive and concurrent sentences;
and even assign or recommend various conditions of probation. The issue is whether we
marshal best evidence-based practices to ensure the highest likelihood of success. We cannot do so if we take the position that our choices do not matter.
90. Measuring the performance of courts in terms of their impact on recidivism is
blasphemy to some judicial ears, but it is no threat to judicial "independence." See generally
MICHAEL

MARCUS,

MEANINGFUL

PERFORMANCE

MEAsuREs

AND

JUDICIAL

INDEPENDENCE

(2006), available at http://ouworld.compuserve.com/homepages/SMMarcus/PerfMeasJudInd.pdf. Nor can performance measurement be justly avoided by the notion that courts
do not control all of the variables that contribute to recidivism. Corrections, probation,
and law enforcement have long accepted crime-related performance measures, and in
common with all useful performance measures, do not depend upon controlling all of the
factors-just upon recognition that the performance in question potentially contributes to
the outcome. See, e.g., Ass'N OF STATE CORR. ADM'RS, PERFORMANCE-BASED MEASURES RESOURCE MANUAL

(2005); HARRY N. BOONE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING

MEASURES IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS (1996), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/perform.txt; HARRY P. HATRY ET AL., How EFFECTIVE ARE YOUR COMMUNITY SERVICES? (2d ed. 1992); Mark H. Moore & Margaret Poethig, Police as an Agency of
Municipal Government: Implicationsfor MeasuringPolice Effectiveness, in MEASURING WHAT MAT
TEES: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE POLICING RESEARCH INSTITUTE MEETINGS 151 (Robert H.
Langworthy ed., 1999); M.W. O'Neill et al., Appraising the Performance of Police Agencies: The
PPPM (PoliceProgram PerformanceMeasures) System, 8 J. POLICE & ADMIN. 253 (1980) (abstract
7 29 7
1).
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=
PERFORMANCE-BASED
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ness of programs and other dispositions in terms of recidivism, and
insisting on evidence-based practices. In turn, evidence-based practices include exploiting data, research, and risk 9' and needs assessment instruments and protocols while continuously vetting data,
research, assessment instruments and protocols for validity and avenues for improvement.
An important piece of giving appropriate emphasis to public
safety is that we must subject the retributive aspects of sentencing to
rigorous assessment to avoid allowing it to compete irrationally and
destructively with public safety. Ultimately, retribution too is charged
with social purposes: to serve a legitimate need of a victim, to prevent
vigilantism or private retribution, to maintain respect for legitimate
authority, or to enhance respect for the persons, property, or rights of
others. 92 These functions are at least as subject to validation as propositions about the general or specific deterrence value of a sentence
or its likely success in accomplishing reformation. 93 In rare cases, direct pursuit of public safety should yield to other purposes, 94 but we
cannot allow 'just punishment" to provide immunity against evidencebased practices or against accountability for sentencing that actually
furthers public safety or some other legitimate public purpose.
Just deserts is essential-at least in the sense of proportionality as
a limit on severity of sanctions. But as the sole measure of sentencing,
91. Opponents of risk assessment bemoan their imprecision and promote the fallacy
that they "punish future crimes." See, e.g., ALLAN MANSON ET AL., SENTENCING AND PENAL
POLICY IN CANADA (2d ed. 2008); Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions ofDangerousness,
in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1-50 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1985). Of course we
must be vigilant in validating and improving the instruments and their administration. But
the status quo of sentencing is far more fallible, unfair, and destructive than modern risk
assessment instruments. They are regularly used in pretrial and correctional settings, and
are crucial to the success of many common public and entrepreneurial pursuits. It is important that we do not use them irresponsibly, but it is equally irresponsible not to make
the best use of them that we can. See Marcus, Comments on the MPC, supra note 7, at 146-47
and accompanying text; Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3, at 108-09 and accompanying text; Michael Marcus, Post-Booker Sentencing Issuesfor a Post-Booker Court, 18 FED.
SENT'G REP. 227, 228-29 (2006).
92. See Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3.
93. Id. at 78-80, 84-85, 90.
94. The social drinker who has driven impaired and killed someone but will never
drink again, and the opportunistic sex offender whose child victim needs the offender's
punishment for therapeutic purposes, provide examples where public values require substantial punishment even if recidivism is preventable by less punitive means. "Direct pursuit" of public safety is as distinct from the indirect ways in which pursuing public values
through sentencing may also promote public safety. Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra
note 3, at 88-93.
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it is an absolute barrier to rational pursuit of public safety and to real
progress in responding to the crisis that underlies Assembly Bill 900.
II.

All Sentences Are About Public Safety

The titles of Assembly Bill 900, "the Public Safety and Offender
Rehabilitation Services Act of 2007,"95 and of the California "Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation," 96 serve as apt introductions
for this part of the analysis. The culture and practice of criminal justice is woefully distorted by various and mistaken notions about the
relationship among rehabilitation, incarceration, and public safety.
As discussed, the misguided present direction of the American
Law Institute Model Penal Code revision and the segment of
academia it represents is that while we may pursue rehabilitation
when reasonable to believe it will reduce criminal behavior, we must
persist in allocating prison resources on the basis ofjust deserts rather
than public safety. 9 7 The courts, on the other hand, generally glean
that rehabilitation competes with public safety, and that when public
safety prevails, the result is imprisonment. 98 Assembly Bill 900 commendably identifies risk and needs assessment, programming, postprison supervision, and reintegration as means by which to prevent
recidivism and thereby serve public safety. 99 However, it largely strug95.

A.B. 900, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12838 (Deering Supp. 2008).
97. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., In re Luisa Z., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that adult
incarceration seeks to punish in pursuit of retribution, while incarceration under the California Youth Authority seeks to protect society by rehabilitation, in part by punishment for
the purpose of rehabilitation); State v. Kinkel, 56 P.3d 463, 469 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing that the weight to be accorded public safety and rehabilitation vary with the circumstances of the situation). In the context of probation conditions, California courts
commonly speak of the "dual purposes of rehabilitation and public safety." See, e.g., People
v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Public safety objectives cannot
always be reasonably pursued by rehabilitation, but rehabilitation-in a rational system-is
always a means by which to pursue public safety rather than a distinct and competing
"purpose."

96.

99. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3020 (Deering 2008) (codifying AB 900, section 11,
which addresses criminogenic assessments of inmates to reduce the chance of reoffending); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3073 (Deering 2008) (codifying AB 900, section 12, which addresses day treatment and crisis care for parolees with mental health issues to reduce
recidivism); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3105 (Deering 2008) (codifying AB 900, section 13, an
Inmate Treatment and Prison-to-Employment Plan, which attempts to reduce chances of
returning to prison); CAL. PENAL CODE § 6270 (Deering 2008) (codifying AB 900, section
16, which addresses continuity of services to promote successful reintegration into society),
CAL. PENAL CODE § 6272 (Deering 2008) (addressing reentry facilities to provide risk and
needs assessments, case management services, and wraparound services).
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gles to accommodate the continuation of a prison system engulfed
with punishment regardless of any impact on public safety. California
courts have often spoken of the "dual purposes" of public safety and
rehabilitation, typically in the context of terms of probation or release
as distinguished from prison itself.10 0 The public, for its part, persists
in the fallacy that severity and effectiveness are synonymous-largely
as a result of the combination of the common-sense expectation that
we use prison for public safety and the reality that instead we resort to
ordered just deserts.
Escaping this conundrum is critical to substantial progress. The
only sufficient justification within a criminal justice system for requiring offenders to participate in programs at all or in lieu of or during
imprisonment is that rehabilitation is the most appropriate means by
which to attempt to reduce their future criminality in order to promote public safety. Alternatives such as fines or community service are
much cheaper than custodial sanctions. If the only purpose is punishApart from the enormous flaw that these laudable provisions have no potential for
improving the selection of which offenders to send to prison in the first place, they also
leave important details to flounder. It is critical that assessments be exploited for evidencebased assignment to programs (or not) based on their likely impact on the offender's
future criminal behavior. The experience of criminal justice for generations has been that
merely proclaiming our purposes in erecting procedures does nothing to ensure that we
serve those purposes. Merely studying and reporting on "effectiveness" of efforts to reduce
recidivism, CAL. PENAL CODE § 6141 (Deering 2008), or planning to address it, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 2054.2 (Deering 2008), is notoriously ineffective without strategies for assuring that
we use what we learn. Oregon has required studies of effectiveness and plans for achieving
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 135.980, 137.656 (2007). However, hope for any
it for years. See, e.g.,
impact on the performance of corrections has arisen only since Oregon adopted incentives
for the Department of Corrections to devote increasing portions of program money to
"evidence based programs." OR. REv. STAT. §§ 182.515, 183.525 (2007). Even these statutes
risk accepting form instead of demanding substance, as they define an "evidence based
program" as one that "[i]ncorporates significant and relevant practices based on scientifically based research." Id. § 182.515. Experience teaches that we risk encouraging programs
to emulate studied, successful programs, and assessing them by whether they look like
studied programs rather than whether they perform well-which may vary with the cohort of
offenders accepted into the program. AB 900 employs a similar strategy by conditioning
jail and prison capital funding on program and planning steps. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 15819.41, 15820.918 (Deering Supp. 2008) (codifying AB 900, sections 3 and 5); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 7021 (Deering 2008) (codifying AB 900, section 22). This approach is as
crucial to success as the requirement of assurance that any jail beds constructed will be
staffed. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15820.906, .916 (Deering Supp. 2008) (codifying AB 900, sections 4 and 5). Multnomah County, Oregon, spent close to $60 million building a new jail
facility which has remained unavailable for want of staffing for over three years as of this
writing. Don Hamilton, Count,: HaveJail, Will Share, PORTLAND ThIB., Feb. 4, 2005, at 1-2,
available at http://www.thetfibonline.com/news/story.php?story-id=28215. But funding
programs is not the same as selecting them for quality and rigorously studying their graduates' ability to avoid criminal behavior.
100. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 66, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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ment, these alternatives are far easier and less costly to administer and
monitor for success than programs designed to reduce criminal behavior, in part because participation is the point rather than the impact measured by reduction in recidivism. 10 1 Indeed, caning makes
more sense than the vast majority of prison sanctions-at least at the
option of the offender-if our only purpose is punishment, even assuming that we include the utilitarian functions of general and specific deterrence. 10 2 That we pursue rehabilitation through programs is
also the legitimate answer to complaints that people should not have
to commit crimes to gain access to scarce social services: we do not do
it for the welfare of offenders, but for the welfare of the community. 10 3 Benefit to the offender is a welcome byproduct or tactical prerequisite, but the goal is public safety or we should not be spending
corrections resources on rehabilitation.
At the same time, the only sufficient justification for the tremendous public investment and nonmonetary costs of maintaining an extensive system of jails and prisons is also public safety-primarily
04
through the means of incapacitation, and at least theoretically
through the strategies of specific and general deterrence. In a rational
system of justice, within the limits of proportionality, priority, and resource, we rehabilitate those capable of rehabilitation with reasonable
confidence in the community unless the risk they represent requires
their incapacitation pending rehabilitation. On the other hand, we
101. It is worth noting that minimal sanctions are sufficient for substantial subsets of
low-risk offenders for any of several reasons: they will not reoffend regardless of the sentence; resource limitations require that we devote available resources to higher risk offenders; and we are likely to increase the risk the offender represents to the public with the
available resources. For these subsets, sentencing properly responds merely to the social
need for "consequences" for violating the law (and to any victim's need for restitution or a
sense that justice has been done). It would help significantly, however, to embrace evidence-based practices in assessing the social needs, rather than merely relying on pretense.
See Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra note 3, at 77-83.
102. General deterrence assumes that punishing one offender will convince others not
to misbehave; specific deterrence assumes that punishing one offender will convince that
offender not to misbehave again.
103. Of course, the welfare of the community is promoted by social service programs.
We fund them largely to protect the quality of life, economic health, and health and safety
of society as a whole. But criminal justice dollars find justification in treatment expenses
more readily when the point is crime reduction, while public welfare programs suffer no
contradiction when their justification is the welfare of the immediate recipient.
104. Without launching a full review of what we know about the limits of general and
specific deterrence in practice-having to do with the impulsive nature of most crime and
the typical delay between choice and consequence, among many other impediments to
their success-the present point is merely that we should deploy them on the basis of
reason and evidence, not blind faith.
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incapacitate high-risk offenders whose risk we cannot dependably mitigate for as long as proportionality and resources permit. In prison, a
rational system allocates programs to those offenders whose post
prison criminality will be reduced by those programs. Our sentencing
choices should all be for public safety; rehabilitation and incarceration may compete as the best disposition for a given offender, but not
because one is pursued for public safety while the other is not.
The second critical realization, then, is that we must approach all
sentencing choices-whether mere fines or community service, various levels of probationary supervision with treatment or alternative
sanctions, or prison-on the basis that (1) their value is dependent
upon their likely impact on public safety; and (2) that we should select
among them on that basis within the limits of law, proportionality,
risk, and resource. And unless we act on this realization when we determine which offenders to send to prison, trying to make the best of
things once they get there is at best a palliative.
III.

The Issue Is What Works on Which Offenders

To the substantial extent that criminology, corrections, and public debate attend to the issue of what successfully reduces crime, most
attention is given to whether treatment, probation, or punishment
"works" to protect society. 10 5 Different cohorts of participants in the
debate are aligned on opposite sides of such questions as whether
drug treatment, sex offender treatment, programs in general, prison,
or strategies such as general or specific deterrence, treatment courts,
or diversion mechanisms "work."10 6 Perhaps the single most important proclamation of the "Maryland Study"-still the most comprehensive review of literature on the efficacy of programs aimed at
criminal offenders-was that "[t]he important issue is not whether
something works but what works for whom.' 0 7 Sentencing culture,
ignoring this critical step, is predominantly shaped by stalemates between opposing views in each of these debate cohorts. Thus, the
choice between prison and probation, rehabilitation and punishment
(in the punitive sense), and even among programs as to crimes routinely relegated to community-based dispositions, is driven by generic
105. See, e.g., DORIS LAYrON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONs 3 (2006).
106. Marcus, Justitia'sBandage, supra note 2, at 3.
107. Doris L. MacKenzie, CriminalJustice and Crime Prevention, in PREVENTING CRIME
9-18 (1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/docfiles/wholedoc.doc. For a synopsis, see
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME (1997), availableat
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/1716 76.pdf.
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policy decisions. Those choices are driven by allocation of resources,
just deserts, and symmetry, and are overwhelmingly blind to outcomes. Individualization in the sense of fitting the disposition to the
offender, while jealously guarded as ajudicial function, is usually driven
by just deserts or folklore concerning what sentences reduce recidivism by offenders in general or convenient subcategories of offenders-rather than by serious attempts at risk or needs assessment and
evidence-based analysis.
Assembly Bill 900 commendably prescribes assessments for in08 presumably for
mates and participants in reintegration facilities,'
purposes of assigning individuals to the programs and other responses
that are most likely to reduce the criminal behavior of those individuals. We must demand that sentencing follow suit by insisting that we
sentence individuals with due regard to best evidence about which dispositions are most likely to work on those individuals. In sentencing
and within corrections, however, it is not enough to conduct the assessments and merely to announce their purposes. Assembly Bill 900
declares that risk and needs assessments be conducted and that programs be supplied. 109 Even aside from the circumstance that Assembly
Bill 900 does not improve sentencing, it ignores critical steps: (1) using the assessments to deliver correctional resources in ways that carry
the best chance of success; (2) continuing reassessment and improvement of our knowledge of what works (and what does not) on which
offenders; and (3) employing meaningful performance measurements and feedback with respect to sentencing analysis and practice.
A meaningful solution must add strategies to achieve these ends, and
to accomplish the same improvement in the sentencing decisions that
presently allocate offenders to prison and to probation.
IV.

Plea Bargaining Determines Most Sentences

At a recent meeting of a National Institute of Justice workgroup
(of which I am a member) on court technology and public safety, a
prosecution representative proclaimed that district attorneys, not
judges, do the bulk of sentencing in our system. This position is overwhelmingly accurate. Typically, well over ninety percent of criminal
110 Although there are many local
cases are resolved by plea bargains.
§§ 3020, 6272 (Deering 2008).
Assem. 900, 2007 Reg. Sess. §§ 2, 3, 6, 11, 13, 16 (Cal. 2007).
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 276, 277 (2005); PATRICK A. LANCAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS (1992),
92
.txt; see also Blackledge v. A]available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/njrp
108.
109.
110.

CAL. PENAL CODE
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variations and judges in theory maintain both control and responsibility for sentences imposed as a result of plea negotiations,1 1 ' in practice most sentences are imposed in accordance with "recommendations," "agreements," or mutual expectations arising out of a plea
agreement that determines at least the charges for which the offender
will be sentenced and, routinely, the sentence the offender will receive." 2 While case weaknesses, cooperation agreements, or other
considerations may temper a prosecutor's preference, a plea agreement rarely reaches a court until and unless the prosecutor has accepted its terms with express or implied satisfaction with the sentence
the parties expect the offender to receive. 113
The power of prosecutorial discretion through plea bargaining
has been a fertile field for academic discourse.' 14 The issue in most of
this discussion is whether and how the impact of prosecutorial power
might be brought under judicial control. 1 5 Nevertheless, the issue
here is not which branch of criminal justice has control but the ends
to which any control is directed. For present purposes, the point is
that no attempt to change the culture of sentencing holds much
promise for producing any public benefit until and unless that change
reaches plea bargaining.
Prosecution charging, plea bargaining, and probation violation
policies may obstruct court efforts to maximize the effectiveness of
lison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); People v. Panizzon, 913 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Cal. 1996). When
Riverside County's district attorney deviated from plea bargaining as usual, civil trials could
not be had for two years, requiring Chief Justice Ronald George to assemble a strike team
of twenty-seven active and retired judges to attack the staggering backlog of criminal cases.
Nicole Brambila, Civil Trials on Docket Once More, DESERT SUN, Jan. 4, 2008, at B3.
111. See, e.g., People v. Kaanehe, 559 P.2d 1028, 1036-37 (Cal. 1977).
112. "Although in most jurisdictions the sentence in a plea bargain is technically set by
a judge, the prosecutor's deal is virtually always implemented." State v. Rummer, 432
S.E.2d 39, 70 n.16 (W. Va. 1993).
113. See sources cited supra notes 110-12.
114. A recent article collects much of the writing on the subject and offers comparisons with continental law countries-which at least serves to prove that criminal justice
may vary its approach to the role of prosecutors. Yue Ma, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Plea
Bargainingin the United States, France, Germany, and Italy: A ComparativePerspective, 12 INT'L
CRIM. JUST. REv. 22 (2002).
115. From a prosecutor's perspective, the issue may seem to be how to prevent resource limitations from allowing offenders to escape an "appropriate punishment." Prosecutors have adopted many strategies to bring plea bargaining under the control of a
jurisdiction's elected or appointed prosecutor, and to ensure some measure of equal treatment. However, the public impact of those efforts depends not just upon their success in
achieving uniformity or severity, but also upon how well they generate dispositions that
reduce future criminal conduct. The challenge is to harness plea bargaining controls to
that purpose.
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sentencing outcomes in reducing recidivism. In many jurisdictions,
for example, the vast majority of sentences result from plea bargaining processes in which the prosecution and defense reach agreement
116 "Such agreeon the sentence to be recommended to the court.
ments rarely, if ever, consider evidence of the likely impact of the stipcriminality, or the likely
ulated disposition on the offender's future
' 17
dispositions."'
potential
other
of
impact
In the end . . .the best evidence that plea bargaining has held

evolutionary sway over its sibling criminal-justice institutions ...
may be our inability to name a single important procedural innovathat threatened to choke off plea bargaintion of the last 150 years
1 18
ing and yet flourished.

Surely the role of judges differs in many respects from that of
prosecutors. 119 Both have a responsibility to serve public safety
through sentencing and advocating for sentences within the range
available in law and in fact. On rare occasion, it may be necessary to
deviate from the best attempt at public safety in order to serve public
values. 120 But both betray public expectation and public duty to the
extent that they allowjust deserts to act as a shield against accountability for best efforts to serve public safety and public values. The analysis
regarding defense attorneys is more complicated, as they are charged
with representing the interests and pursuing the objectives of clients
within legal and ethical rules. However, that role may often correspond with pursuing the sentence that is most likely to work in terms
of crime reduction. 12' When it does not correspond, the advocate's
competent debate with proponents of a sentence should function as it
should throughout the rest of the adversarial process of the criminal
law-largely to challenge and to refine cvidence and analysis. But our
See sources cited supra notes 110-12.
Warren, supra note 6, at 1315.
118. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 202 (2003).
119. The "Harm Reduction Code," proposed in Marcus, Responding to the MPC, supra
note 3, at 83-138, proposes sentencing functions for judges (section 5), prosecutors (section 7), and defense attorneys (section 8), that are consistent with their diverse roles. Id.
120. See supra notes 85, 94 and accompanying text.
121. For example, a client may prefer inpatient treatment to presumptive prison; defense counsel may serve public safety by demonstrating that the drug treatment assumed to
be available during the presumptive prison sentence is in fact unavailable (because the
defendant will have too short a term or is for some other reason ineligible for scarce treatment beds in the prison). If in fact the inpatient treatment is more likely to prevent recidivism than prison without treatment, and assuming the defendant's risk level is sufficiently
low to justify community-based inpatient treatment the defense advocacy might well serve
public safety better than the sentence that would result without that advocacy.
116.
117.
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task is to divert all of this energy and attention towards evidence-based
practices.
Efforts at collaboration among courts, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys are surely part of any solution.1 2 2 Even so,judges and legislatures have an opportunity to introduce rather dramatic changes in the
processes and behaviors that constitute the practice of criminal justice. Judges have all seen rapid responses by criminal practitioners to
significant appellate decisions such as Crawford v. Washington,123
Blakely v. Washington,124 and Illinois v. Caballes.'25 States that adopted
guidelines saw sentencing practice transformed with remarkable
speed, particularly when plastic-covered guideline charts became as
ubiquitous in courtrooms as gavels.' 26 Much prattle about deserts 12 7
was almost immediately displaced by lawyers chatting confidently
about how guidelines applied to a given defendant's case, and the sentencing discussion became about gridblocks, departures, and whichever items of "aggravation" and "mitigation" the Legislature or
sentencing commission happened to articulate.' 2 This change did little to improve the impact of sentencing, but it demonstrates that
courts can change things without awaiting a consensus; courts can and
should lead on this issue, and not merely by devising dockets to speed

122. Warren, supra note 6, at 1315.
123. 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (invalidating a wide swath of cases approving exceptions to the
constitutional right of confrontation).
124. 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (articulating the right to a jury trial on any sentencing enhancement fact if the existence of that fact is a prerequisite under state law to a higher
level of imprisonment than would otherwise be available to the sentencing judge).
125. 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (suggesting that constitutional limits on search and seizure
may be substantially truncated when the object of the search is deemed "contraband").
Although this case may not have the impact of Crawford or Blakely, Caballes represents the
turbulent nature of search and seizure law in general, which dramatically impacts the behaviors of prosecution and defense attorneys in court. Id.
126. Marcus, Justitia'sBandage, supra note 2, at 24.
127. I am not suggesting that proportionality and desert are insignificant, or that all
who address them do so frivolously. Nonetheless, much of what is said in their name in
typical court proceedings has little substance.
128. Marcus, Justitia's Bandage, supra note 2, at 24. Oregon's rules on aggravating and
mitigation factors are found in OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-002 (2008), as contemplated by OR.
REv. STAT. § 37.080 (2007). Similar dramatic changes in what goes on and is said in courtrooms accompanied the adoption of child support guidelines that are essentially mathematical. The Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2000), essentially required all
states to adopt such guidelines. In short order, practitioners who used to talk about need,
ability, sympathy, and misbehavior, while urging a higher or lower support amount, started
spending much of that effort filling in blanks on worksheets or online.
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the flow of cases towards dispositions, particularly if most are likely to
129
do more harm than good.
We are just beginning seriously to address this issue in my court. I
will be advocating for a strategy that pushes the discussion of best
practices back from courtrooms into plea negotiations-perhaps initially by merely requesting with each plea an explanation for how public safety is promoted and when and why it may be compromised. We
might well articulate standards for preparedness of counsel on such
issues as the availability of relevant resources, program waiting lists, or
30
prison conditions.1 Other judges have different suggestions, and we
are certainly not in a position to deliver solutions to others at this
stage in our work.
For present purposes, the point is simply that no change in the
ills that generated Assembly Bill 900 can be successful until the very
culture of sentencing changes, and no change in the culture of sentencing can occur without a corresponding paradigm shift in plea
bargaining.
V.

Conclusion

Assembly Bill 900 evidences some significant strategies and important ingredients that may contribute to solving the dysfunctions of
criminal justice to which it attempts to respond. However, as with
voter sentencing initiatives and sentencing guidelines, its potential is
crippled because it fails to repair the predominant engine of resource
allocations in criminal justice: sentencing. Prison populations are persistently swelled by the return of alumni and by a flow of new inmates
that smarter sentencing would have diverted to more effective and less
destructive dispositions. Both result from a sentencing culture that is
gravely distorted by the use of just deserts to shield participants from
accountability for our public safety impact. The process spawns avoidable victimizations, misuses both community and prison resources,
and relegates fixes like Assembly Bill 900 to the role of palliative.
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To achieve meaningful improvement, we must recognize thatjust
deserts is not enough. Sentencing must rigorously employ evidencebased best practices in pursuit of public safety. All sentencing choices,
from mere fines, through probation, to prison and parole, are properly invoked as means to the end of public safety; we must overcome
the fallacy that public safety competes with rehabilitation. We cannot be
efficient in deploying correctional resources until we act on the reality
that risk and need assessment are essential for identifying which disposition-program, alternative, or length ofjail or prison-is most likely
to work on which offenders. We must achieve best practices, not
merely nominal symmetry between crime and punishment. Finally, although all strategies for improvement must recognize these propositions, they must also cope with the reality that there will be no change
in the culture or impact of sentencing practices until that change dramatically alters plea bargaining.
When we recognize these four enormous ingredients of the problem at which Assembly Bill 900 is aimed, and responsibly address
them, we may finally make some real progress. When we realize that
just deserts does not begin to fulfill the social responsibility of criminal justice, that the entire range of crime and punishment affects public safety, that different things work or not on different offenders, and
come up with evidence-based solutions that redirects plea bargaining
accordingly, we may end the brutality that allows avoidable victimizations and punishes with no public benefit.

